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Abstract
After discussing the general issues with user participation in information systems development and aspect of
user awareness with information security processes, this article raises a series of issues concerned with user
participation with the information security aspects of the user requirements during information systems
development processes. These issues are then developed into a theoretical model concerned with user
participation in the elicitation of information security requirements during systems development processes.
While most of these issues are known in the general systems development context, when they arise in the
information security context, they are easily overlooked or neglected. The theoretical model and the associated
issues presented are candidates further research work within the information security domain.
Keywords
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INTRODUCTION
It is sometimes claimed that information security measures, implemented within information systems and
business processes, are just another form of user requirements, in much the same way that the functional aspects
of these systems and processes are user requirements (Baskerville 1993; Gerber and von Solm 2005).
Increasingly, over time, within information systems practice we have been seeing users take a more active role in
the specification and design of the functional requirements, but the same is often not the case for the information
security measures. Information security is often perceived of as a technical problem during systems development
and security policy formulation, where the major inputs to policy and requirements specification come from
technical and information security staff – this security-centric approach frequently minimises the contribution
from users in business areas, contrasting with this increased level of user involvement with the functional
requirements.
Confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) of information are central to information security and this paper
will take a broad view of the information security term, encompassing these elements as they play out with
information and the associated systems and technology. Taking integrity as an example of these CIA elements, it
is the users who need a certain degree of accuracy or completeness with the data in their systems in order to take
the actions that they do with the outputs of these systems. The information security staff are rarely, if ever, acting
on the functional outputs of these systems, so would have little appreciation for the degree of accuracy needed in
the data, and consequently, would be very poorly placed to specify the requirements around this or any of the
other components of integrity. Similar comments could be made in relation to the confidentiality and availability
of information within these systems.
With this in mind, this paper presents a case for greater user involvement in specifying the requirements for
information security measures. The paper will start with a brief look at the general issues around user
involvement in systems development, and then follow this up with a discussion around information security
related aspects of user involvement and awareness. This will then lead in to the development of a theoretical
model concerned with user participation with information security issues within ISD projects. The model is
currently work in progress, with the discussion identifying a range of issues that could be areas for further
research.
USER INVOLVEMENT IN SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT REQUIREMENTS
The issue of user involvement in systems development activities has been an area of major interest in IS research
since the early days of the discipline (Barki and Hartwick 1989; He and King 2008; Hirschheim 1983; Iivari et
al. 2010; King and Cleland 1971). An aspect of this interest is a concern with high rates of project failure, with
one of the dimensions of this failure being poor understanding of user requirements (often because of poor user
participation practices), and the developed system (if completed) not being what was required by the user
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community. Deficiencies around requirements specification is now often claimed as the greatest single cause of
failures of software projects (Hansen and Lyytinen 2010). This connection between some level of user
participation and the elicitation of quality user requirements, or even more broadly, overall project success has
been the subject of more recent IS research. As an example, Harris and Weistroffer (2009) survey much of the
relevant literature in this area and use this to establish a strong connection between levels of user participation
and project success.
In a meta-analysis of 82 empirical studies on user participation, He and King (2008) conclude “that user
participation is somewhat beneficial in ISD” and “its effects on ISD attitudinal/behavioural outcomes were found
to be significant and moderately strong in magnitude; its effects on productivity outcomes, albeit significant,
were found to be limited with small effect sizes”. They note, however, that “the overall modest effect of user
participation suggests that user participation alone may not be sufficient to predict the success of ISD projects,
especially when productivity outcomes are of research interest”. They then conclude that this has “strong
implications for ISD practitioners . . . if system acceptance is the ultimate goal, user participation should be
designed to induce more psychological involvement . . . among potential users”.
There is much complexity around the nature of user participation and what forms of participation are important
within ISD and IT projects. This complexity ranges from issues around the nature of the participation effort
through to the nature of the projects themselves, and includes the following factors:


the nature of the user participation – this can range from simple involvement (such as just being
consulted) through to more active participation (such as taking on project roles), and is also concerned
with the types of activities and the amount of participation that this might entail;



the level of expertise brought by the users to the participation context, and their degree of involvement;



whether users are in-house or external to the organisation, the geographic distribution of users, and even
just the overall large numbers of potential users in some projects, along with the diversity of
requirements sources;



the heterogeneous nature of some user communities, with some systems being used by highly diverse
users, some with high level skills ranging down to others who may be quite IT-illiterate;



the variety of systems developmental approaches and modes (in house, purchased, COTS-based
developments, traditional versus agile, etc.) and the complexity of the system being considered;



the increasing use of inter-organisational systems, and also the need for standardised systems within
organisations and across multiple organisations such as franchises.

The broad issues with this area of research have been well summarised in a number of papers, including: Hansen
et al. (2009); He and King (2008); Iivari et al. (2010); and Markus and Mao (2004).
Markus and Mao (2004) identify three main issues from the literature that had previously been identified as
contributing to project success:


buy-in by participants, where the psychological impacts of the participation leads to participants
becoming more committed to the systems they have helped develop;



system quality issues, where participation by users can improve the quality of the system requirements
as specified; and



emergent interactions, where the good relationships potentially produced from the process are
conducive to participants being more willing to share requirements information and developers being
more willing to incorporate these requirements into systems.

In the discussion that follows, Markus and Mao explore a range of unresolved issues with each of these
explanations and the possible implications of these issues on the IS participation theory and research. They then
propose a new theoretical foundation with a series of propositions leading to a model depicting a range of
emergent causal processes, elements of which are illustrated in figure 1 below.
In the discussion of this model (described in figure 1), they posit that, while there are causal relationships, as
depicted on the diagram, these are “neither necessary nor sufficient for success . . . they are not sufficient for
success, because good requirements are not always transformed into good products and good products are not
always used with the hoped-for results . . . they are also not necessary for success, because it is sometimes
possible for gifted (or lucky) developers to craft excellent solutions” (Markus and Mao 2004, pp. 537/8).
However the overall picture of user participation is not all positive, with He and King (2008) noting that a
“growing body of qualitative research has identified possible obstacles, drawbacks, or even negative effects

24th Australasian Conference on Information Systems
4-6 Dec 2013, Melbourne

Participation with information security in ISD
Kleeman

arising from the practice of user participation, such as user-developer conflict, communication gaps,
communication lapses, and increased ISD workload”. This would suggest that there is a need for some caution
with the view that all user participation in information systems development will produce useful outcomes.

Figure 1 Updated IS Participation Theory elements (Figure 5, Markus and Mao, 2004, p 537)
Despite these reservations, it is clear from the body of literature in this area, that there is a substantive case for
some level of user participation in establishing general information systems requirements, and within ISD
projects generally.
INFORMATION SECURITY USER INVOLVEMENT AND AWARENESS
When considering the issue of user participation with information security issues within projects, and the
potential for user-centric approaches, it is useful to look at broader user involvement in, and awareness of,
information security. Most of the current references and texts deal with this mainly through the need for users to
be aware of information security issues so that they can enforce the relevant countermeasures and detect various
intrusions or breaches of security mechanisms. That is, they establish the key role of users as important
participants in information security, rather than as designers of the security requirements. This is the main form
of awareness promoted in some of the current texts such as Merkow and Breithaupt (2006); Slay and Koronios
(2006); Volonino and Robinson (2004); Whitman and Mattord (2010); and Whitman and Mattord (2011).
Rainer et al. (2007) also note that managerial issues are high on the list of issues that information security
professionals need to be aware of. They point out the need for business managers and information security
professionals to move more toward each other on the spectrum – where business managers need to become more
aware of information security technical issues and information security professionals needing to become more
aware of business management issues. Despite this, they fail to deal with the question of whether business
managers should be more involved in specifying information security policy and information security
requirements for developing systems, as the primary focus in the article appears to be concerned with
management support for information security including low funding and the justification for security
expenditures.
Tracey (2007) makes a case for making security “the default thinking mode” in today’s organisations and
suggests that this can be accomplished through “including security in business decision-making process” and
using organisational procedures to enforce this, but again, the emphasis appears to be mainly concerned
developing a security culture that will help to improve the effectiveness of the existing security measures.
Siponen and Vance (2010) discuss the issue of employee’s failure to comply with information security policies,
and their application of neutralisation techniques as a means of rationalising this behaviour. Relating back to
research in other areas where neutralisation techniques are applied (Greenberg 1990, as quoted in Siponen and
Vance 2010), they suggest that seminars and education play a key role in inhibiting employees’ attempts to use
techniques of neutralisation, and use this to justify the need for employee education. The implication from this
research is that user education needs to focus on the rationale underpinning the information security measures, so
that the users are informed of: what the measures are that they need to comply with; how they work; and what
they are meant to achieve with respect to the business processes that the users are engaged with.
This is connected to a debate that seems to have surfaced in some security circles related to the extent of
transparency to users for any security measures. This is discussed in various papers, but Dourish et al. (2004)
gives a good summary of the issues, with his definition of “transparency” being that security measures are
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invisible to the users and with these users relying on assurances from their system administrators that their work
will meet appropriate security standards.
Dourish et al. (2004) note that while transparent structures free the user of the need to understand the technical
concepts behind the security mechanisms, they form the view that security mechanisms should be visible to the
users as it allows them to “see how to manipulate their security environment when the unexpected happens or
when a computer system requires troubleshooting”. However, concerns may arise in situations where users lack
the expertise to competently manipulate their security environment and, as such, may potentially leave
themselves exposed to significant threats that arise from unintentionally leaving their security environment in a
weakened state. This becomes quite evident in the discussion of a study (Whitten and Tygar (1999) as quoted in
Dourish et al. (2004)) showing the difficulty users had in successfully using PGP software to encrypt/decrypt
their email, but no resolutions to this problem are provided in the Dourish paper.
These arguments are further developed by DiGioia and Dourish (2005) where they note that “what ‘secure’
means at any given moment is a determination that only an end user can make” and that “attempts to make
systems inherently secure, then, are problematic because they presuppose what ‘secure’ might be, taking that
decision out of the users’ hands”. This “transparent” approach to security appears to be associated with securitycentric approaches, and the implication in these two articles is that these approaches have problems that can lead
to flawed security in many cases.
With these points in mind, this raises a question around the issue of user awareness of the security mechanisms
operating in their environment. The questions that Dourish et al. 2004 were interested in related to users’
perceptions of security and how they know systems are secure enough for them and their work. It seems that they
would be unable to answer that question if their awareness of security in their environment was low, and in these
situations they would be relying heavily on the assurances given by the technical experts that adequate protection
mechanisms had been put in place. In addition, Siponen and Vance (2010) would also suggest that they are less
likely to comply with security measures in these circumstances.
However, this brings up a conundrum – if the technical experts had not consulted with users about their security
requirements, then it is likely that some users would be uneasy that the experts actually knew what levels of
security were actually required, and thus would lack the confidence that these experts had provided appropriate
levels of protection. Whereas, if the experts had consulted with users about their requirements then they would
have a higher level of awareness than this minimal level noted above.
This suggests, that for some users at least, there is a need to have a reasonable level of awareness about security
mechanisms in their environment and, as a minimum, this is likely to be partly developed through appropriate
consultation mechanisms. It could be argued that the more involved users are in establishing their security
environment, the more aware they will become of these issues, and thus, more confident that the environment will
be properly constituted to meet their needs in this area. This involvement should be more with the higher levels
of security requirements along with regular feedback against performance measures, than at a detailed technical
specification.
To be involved at the technical levels would require significant technical skills that could only be gained through
time consuming training activities and well beyond the level of effort most users would want to put into this
activity. However, the higher level requirements specification and review activities could be achieved with much
less effort on their part. In many ways, this is consistent with the specification of other, more traditional,
elements of user requirements, where the users may not have, or even desire, the detailed technical knowledge for
these specifications, but do want to be directly involved in their high level specification.
This broad discussion now leads to a possible theoretical model concerned with user participation with
information security issues within information systems development projects.
A THEORETICAL MODEL OF USER PARTICIPATION WITH INFORMATION SECURITY ISSUES
WITHIN ISD PROJECTS
In order to understand these issues, it is important that there is some discussion around what is meant by
“improved information security outcomes”. This discussion then leads into the elaboration of a range of aspects
that relate to user participation in ISD projects. Each of these aspects produces a series of major issues that
contribute to a theoretical model.
A reasonable definition of what is meant by improved information security outcomes in business processes would
be the implementation of appropriate, cost effective information security countermeasures (or controls) that are
commensurate with the levels of risks that the business process is exposed to. A range of measures can have an
important impact on achieving these outcomes, including issues such as: the use of risk analysis practices to
achieve an understanding across the organisation of the relevant risks; the establishment of requirements for
controls to mitigate these risks, and the actual implementation of these controls; and the conformance with the
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controls by the participants in the business process, this being connected to levels of awareness, senior
management support, and having an appropriate security culture within the organisation.
A question arising from this is whether there is a relationship between well specified information security
requirements, and business processes that have better information security outcomes. Associated with this, there
is also the need to consider whether there may be trade-offs between efforts to specify the information security
controls and the risk reduction this may promote.
User awareness
The earlier discussion on user awareness noted the connection between user awareness of information security
measures (what they are, how they work, what they are meant to achieve) and improved information security
outcomes. Spears and Barki (2010) establish some evidence of this connection between user awareness and
more effective information security measures, noting the important role played by users in the implementation of
these measures within business processes, and connecting levels of awareness with the effectiveness of the
implementation of these measures. Spears and Barki also note that user participation in “security risk
management” (SRM) has significant benefits for improving levels of user awareness. An implication that can be
drawn from this is that user participation in the specification of information security requirements during systems
development is likely to have a similar outcome with respect to user awareness.
The earlier discussion concerning application of neutralisation techniques by employees raised by Siponen and
Vance (2010) is evidence of the important role played by seminars and education in inhibiting employees’ failure
to comply with information security policies. This user education needs to focus on the rationale underpinning
the information security measures, so that the users are informed of what the measures are that they need to
comply with, how they work, and what they are meant to achieve with respect to the business processes that the
users are engaged with.
This first issue would appear to be well established by this evidence, but it is important to the overall theoretical
model, so will be stated here.
Issue 1: Improving levels of user awareness of information security issues leads to improved information
security outcomes. User should be made aware of what the information security measures are, how they work,
and what they are meant to achieve.
Participants
When discussing participative practices for the development and specification of information security
requirements, there is a need to consider who the actors will be in such processes, and what roles these actors will
have in the various participation activities.
At the business process end of things, there are a range of users who would need to be considered as candidates
for the participation processes:


hands-on users – these may be internal (employees) or external to the organisation;



managers in business process work areas;



executive champions.

In relation to the executive champions, Markus and Mao (2004) make the point with respect to general systems
development participative practices, that top management support is a form of user participation. The information
security literature also establishes the importance of top management support for general information security
outcomes. Examples of this include Volonino and Robinson (2004, pp. 57-59), and Smith and Jamison (2006).
Both CoBIT 5 (ISACA 2012) and the ISO27000 series standards also put a strong emphasis on senior
management involvement as being important to achieving appropriate information security outcomes. For
example, managements’ responsibility for the information security management system is noted in section 5.1 of
ISO27001 and 6.1.1 of ISO27002. CoBIT 5 (p 22 of the framework document) has a list of important questions
for those involved in governance, including “is the information I am processing well secured?”
With respect to the other, non-executive participants, information systems development processes will usually
impact on many more stakeholders than can effectively participate in a development process generally, and
specifically the development of the information security requirements. There are also situations where some of
the stakeholders are just not able to participate, even if there was capacity to accommodate them in the processes
– for example, many of the external stakeholders are not even identified at the time of the development. As any
connection between participation in the process and the raising of user awareness of information security
measures will be restricted to those who have actually participated at some stage, and that increasing levels of
awareness are connected with improving information security outcomes, then there would need to be
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consideration around the lack of participation for some of the actors in the business process, and how this
situation might be remedied.
Noting that not all stakeholders will be selected for the various participation activities, there is then the question
of which participants are selected, and also an issue of whether these will be “good participants”. Should there
be a combination of managerial and hands-on users? How will the issue of top management support impact on
levels of participation, and on which participants are selected for the various participation roles in the project?
Will the levels of top management support also impact on how seriously those selected take the participation
activities?
Research in the general systems development context indicates that it is important to distinguish between
operational and managerial users when it comes to participation related activities, and that their roles in the
participation activities might be different, with consequent differing impacts on systems development success
(Markus and Mao 2004, p 528; Barki et al. 2001). Markus and Mao (2004) (quoting Akkermans and van Helden
2002) indicated that “participation [by lower level staff] and top management support are mutually reinforcing
tactics”.
Translating this into the information security context raises a number of questions. Which end user participants
should be selected for participation in information security related activities? What impact will top management
support have on these activities and selection of participants, and will it improve the relationship between this
participation and information security outcomes?
There is also the issue of subsequent evolution of the system, after implementation, and the potential impacts of
staff turnover. Staff with useful levels of awareness will move on from the situation at some stage, and new staff
will enter, where they have not had the opportunity to participate in the specification of the information security
requirements. As a consequence, alternative approaches will be needed for these two groups of staff (those who
are left out of the initial participation processes, and those who subsequently join a situation where they play a
role with the business processes). This suggests that a useful output from the development processes may well be
materials that could be used to support any ongoing awareness efforts.
Issue 2: Information security participation activities are more likely to result in improved information security
outcomes when a greater number of stakeholders are involved in the process, and these stakeholder groups
should include operational users and local management personnel from the affected business processes.
Careful consideration is needed around the selection of participants for appropriate outcomes to be achieved.
Issue 3: Concern and interest by executive champions for information security issues will increase the
likelihood of useful engagement with these issues by business process members (operation users and their
managers) in any systems development effort. This interest will also increase the likelihood that those selected
for the participation activities will take that role seriously.
Issue 4: Local managers from business processes can make an ongoing contribution to information security
outcomes after implementation if they are supported by appropriate awareness and education materials
produced during the development processes.
Business analysts
On the developer side of things, there are also issues. Should the normal systems developers, such as the
business analysts (BAs) be undertaking all the participation work, or should an additional group of BAs with
specific information security expertise be brought in to undertake the information security related work? The
earlier discussion indicated that having two separate groups of BAs will lead to the separation of the information
security requirements from the other requirements gathering processes, and will have a potential for reversion to
security-centric approaches, where information security requirements are not considered mainstream, and user
engagement around these issues is neglected. By having the one group of BAs doing all of this work, it will
strengthen the case that these information security issues are normal mainstream issues, and that it is appropriate
for users to engage with these aspects during requirements gathering.
A further issue also arises with this as to the approaches that are taken around participation practices, and the
skills that the relevant BAs may actually have in the area of engaging in meaningful ways with the end users on
information security issues.
Issue 5: Integrating information security requirements gathering into the normal work of business analysts will
improve information security outcomes. Business analysts will need to have an effective process that enables
them to explicitly focus on information security requirements during the requirements gathering process.
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Types of involvement
General participation in systems development activities raises a question about the different types of
involvement, with the possibility of different participation outcomes. These are enumerated in Markus and Mao
(2004), and include:


Solution design – participation in the various phases of the development lifecycle, such as requirements
generation, design, development, and testing;



Solution implementation – participation in post-development system implementation, such as
acceptance testing, installation of the system and conversion activities, planning and execution of
training, and post implementation evaluation of the system and its performance; and



Project management – participation in various project management activities, such as project reporting,
liaising activities, and undertaking the formal project management role.

Markus and Mao (2004) also make a significant note about the quality of the participation experience that is
provided to participants, and their degree of psychological involvement in the participation activities. They
illustrate this with the following example:
“One can participate in development either by responding in 20 minutes to a questionnaire about
requirements or by joining an ERP system configuration team that meets full-time for many months. The
level of personal investment in system development and implementation success is infinitely greater in the
second case, as is participants’ ability to influence system quality.” (Markus and Mao 2004, p 532)
They also go on to note that “ ‘true participation’ involves the ability to make or influence design decisions . . . .
which not all participation activities give equally.”
Bringing this back to the information security context, particularly in the light of this statement, raises the
question about whether participation in some of the development activities is likely to produce better information
security outcomes than the participation in other activities. Markus and Mao (2004) assert that participation
around solution design, particularly in relation to specifying requirements, is likely to produce outcomes related
to system quality, whereas participation in solution implementation activities is more likely to produce outcomes
with system acceptance. They also assert that:
“we believe that participating in a planning or decision-making role (e.g., designing training programs)
provides a richer participation experience than participating in an operational role (e.g., training others
or being trained).” (Markus and Mao 2004, p 532)
While these participation practices still need to be considered in the general ISD context, some of these types of
participation are not quite as relevant to the broader issue of information security and associated requirements
gathering, and for this it is suggested that this could be limited to a number of key areas of participation,
including:


in the solution design area, information security requirements generation and (possibly) design;



in the solution implementation area, acceptance testing of security requirements, conversion of data, the
planning and execution of training, and post implementation evaluation of the system and its
performance.

It is quite likely that any participation concerning information security issues in both of these areas will have an
impact on information security awareness, however, the more that this is “true participation” involving the ability
to influence decisions and to help with design, the more likely this will lead to outcomes with greater potential
for buy-in, with a consequent reduction in the neutralisation behaviour as discussed by Siponen and Vance
(2010).
Further consideration also needs to be given to the extent to which this participation in information security
related activities should be integrated with other systems development participation activities. The broad context
of information security requirements being a subset of other system requirements would suggest that these should
be integrated to some degree, however, even within this integration, it is important that there is some explicit
mention of the information security context, as this would be seen as being strongly connected to the process of
raising awareness of these issues with the participants.
Issue 6: Information security participation activities should be integrated with other user participation
activities, as much as is possible, however, it is important for information security to receive explicit attention
during these participation activities.
Issue 7: The richer the information security participation activities, the more likely this will impact positively on
overall information security outcomes. Participation activities are likely to be richer when participants devote
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ongoing time to project teams and have the ability to influence decision making with respect to information
security requirements and design.
Issue 8: The elicitation of information requirements is likely to be more successful when it is supported by an
explicit process concerned with information security issues.
Choice of participation methods
There are a multitude of ways in which the participation of the various actors can be conducted, ranging from a
simple process where the BAs ask the users about a range of requirements, including their information security
needs, through to full blown participative practices, where some users play a very active role on the project team
over a period of time. Given the comments above about integrating this effort with information security matters
into the other efforts around user participation in a systems development, the nature of this participation should
be broadly consistent with other project based participative practices, but a question could be asked about which
of these practices is likely to lead to better outcomes with respect to the information security needs.
Marcus and Mao (2004) discuss a range of other factors around general participation methods, including the
artefacts that are used to engage with users (for example, various prototyping techniques; and system design
representations of a technical or non-technical nature) and issues around facilitation, location, and financial
incentives for participation. All of these issues would also be relevant to some degree with the information
security requirements.
This question of participation methods is perhaps even more significant in the information security context (as
distinct from the functional requirements context), as participants and developers are likely to have a general lack
of familiarity with information security issues and a possible inclination to leave these matters to the information
security specialists. This would then have the potential for many important areas of information security to be
easily overlooked in the event of a poor process.
As an example, anecdotal experience would indicate that when many people from a background other than IT or
information security are asked about information security, they immediately think that this matter is just about
access controls and confidentiality of information, with little perception that information security extends into
others significant areas. If these perceptions are carried through into a process where participation around
information security matters was poorly organised, then the outcomes of the process are likely to focus heavily on
these issues of who can access what, and what information needs to be kept confidential, with a consequent
neglect of other important issues.
Issue 9: Supporting business analysts dealing with information security issues with materials that identify all
information security issues relevant to end users will facilitate the elicitation of more comprehensive information
security requirements.
Issue 10: Processes concerned with participation in information security issues should be oriented around user
engagement with the elicitation process. These processes should also recognise a multiplicity of interests among
user groups and types (operational and managerial), and should be appropriate for the non-specialist
information security knowledge of participants, focusing on non-technical aspects of information security.
The developed theoretical model
The preceding discussion can be used to represent these concepts diagrammatically by adapting the Marcus and
Mao model presented in figure 1. Figure 2 shows the interrelationships between some of the key concepts that
have been raised and is annotated with numbers for each of the issues that have been identified. This figure,
together with the 10 issues that have been identified in the preceding discussion, represents a theoretical model to
describe the relationships between participation by various actors in a systems development process, and
improved information security outcomes that may arise as a result of this participation.
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Figure 2: A proposed theoretical model connecting participation by stakeholders with information security issues
in systems development situations to improved information security outcomes.
CONCLUSION
This article has raised a series of issues concerned with user participation with information security aspects of the
user requirements during information systems development processes. While most of these issues are known in
the general systems development context, when they arise in the information security context, they are easily
overlooked or neglected. These issues are then developed into a theoretical model concerned with user
participation in the elicitation of information security requirements during systems development processes. Some
of these issues are already supported by existing research within the information security literature, while others
are yet to be actively considered and are good candidates for further research work. As many of these issues are
more qualitative in nature, it is likely that the research will need to be of a more qualitative nature, such as action
research or interpretive case study.
A theoretical model has been presented and could be used as a basis for consolidating research effort into user
participation into information security practices. Associated with this would be a further research question as to
the extent to which users are prepared to spend time on such activities within an information systems
development and security context.
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